I have been struggling with Brian Leiter’s idea of religious toleration, and the quest for a reason for religious toleration in particular. I was finding it hard to put a finger on what seemed to me wrong about it. What is so important about religious toleration, in particular? Indeed, are there not situations in which we ought not to be tolerant of religion and religious practice? Leiter worries about the French idea of laïcité, which essentially refers to the preservation of a secular public sphere, or, as Leiter says:
to preserve the public sphere as a secular one in which persons interact as equal citizens without regard to sectarian identities, religious or ethnic. [Why Tolerate Religion? 104]
Thus, in support of the ideal of laïcité, the French government has banned the wearing of the burqa, hijab and other religiously identifying dress in public. However, says Leiter, given the French antipathy towards Muslims,
… it is tempting to think of this law as a surreptitious assault on the basic protections of religious toleration. [104-5]
This seems to me simply to be wrong. Even if there were the antipathy mentioned, why would removing identifying marks of the religious in public space increase it? Indeed, if people are not wearing identifying marks, it is arguably harder to express antipathy towards someone because of their religious affiliation. If it is racial antipathy, that is, of course, another thing. But there is no reason why people should not feel threatened by a religion which, in its expression elsewhere, and even locally, does not seem compatible with political values that are as precious to the French as the value of laïcité.
Here is where I felt the need to go back and consider the origins of the modern idea of toleration, and how this relates to religious belief. I began by reading John Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration (which is accessible in full here). It is a long time since I had read it, and I was surprised to find how deeply theological it was. Basically, Locke speaks of religious toleration in a theological context, first of all as an aspect of Christianity itself, and then, by separating individual interest into this-worldly and other-worldly considerations. Thus, he begins by speaking about Christian intolerance as contrary to the values of Christianity itself:
For whatsoever some people boast of the antiquity of places and names, or of the pomp of their outward worship; others, of the reformation of their discipline; all, of the orthodoxy of their faith — for everyone is orthodox to himself — these things, and all others of this nature, are much rather marks of men striving for power and empire over one another than of the Church of Christ.
In other words, Christianity itself mandates tolerance, and anything else is simply a play for power and influence. Then he points out that (again according to Christianity) there is only value in belief when it is freely adopted, and not under compulsion. Therefore, the use of fire and sword to force people to profess belief is of little value in achieving people’s salvation. Besides, as he points out from time to time, each believer is orthodox to himself, and it is pointless to try to determine by force what doctrines or beliefs are to be considered orthodox. Well, just so long as people adopt their own orthodoxy, whatever that is. For the one category of people who cannot be tolerated in the commonwealth are atheists. As Locke says so bluntly:
Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all; besides also, those that by their atheism undermine and destroy all religion, can have no pretence of religion whereupon to challenge the privilege of a toleration.
A view expressed, not that long ago, by the elder President Bush, who, remarkably, seemed to be of the same opinion. The assumption lying behind this is that there is a particular reason for tolerating religion, and those who deny religion obviously do not come within the scope of that reason.
The foundational distinction that Locke makes is between this-worldly affairs, such as concerns for property, comfort, riches, public peace, commerce, etc., and after-worldly affairs, the concern for the salvation of souls. The civil authority is restricted to this-worldly affairs, and the various churches and religions (for Locke considers different denominations to be, effectively, different religions), are the business of the various churches, sects and other assemblies to which people belong for the salvation of their souls. The civil authority is the only one to be entrusted with coercive power, and churches and religions are voluntary associations for which members (and hierarchies of power which are mandated within the association) are responsible. To become a member of a religion or denominational group within a religion is to accept the rules of that association, and to agree to subject oneself to them. Therefore, if an individual is expelled from their assembly of choice for disobedience to those rules, the terms are entirely a matter to be settled by the association in accordance with its laws. But beyond that, without the member’s consent, the association cannot go in administering coercive power. The basic purpose of toleration in Locke’s conception of it, it seems, is the domestication of religious assemblies, so that they do not disturb the peace and smooth running of civil order.
However, Locke’s is not the only Enlightenment voice that needs to be heard, and hearing the more radical voice will, I think, even call Leiter’s position into question. For Leiter assumes, not that religion alone is worthy of toleration, which should be given, he believes, to any philosophical world view, religious or not, but that it is world-views that deserve toleration more than (what we might call) unsystematic opinions or beliefs. And this is where Spinoza comes in. I have not read Spinoza deeply, so will depend on Jonathan Israel’s view of Spinoza’s idea of toleration as expressed in his hugely impressive (as well as huge) tome, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 (thanks to Charles Freeman for the reference). According to Israel, different streams of Enlightenment thought can be distinguished. There is the Moderate Enlightenment, to which Locke belongs, and then there is the Radical Enlightenment, to which Spinoza (and others, of course. in both cases) belongs. We have looked briefly at Locke’s idea of toleration.
Spinoza’s idea of toleration is almost entirely different, and is based on very different concerns. Indeed, it is premised upon the danger of religious institutions and their accumulations of power. Here is how Israel puts it:
In Spinoza [contrasted with Locke], freedom of worship, far from constituting the core of toleration, is very much a secondary question, a topic which he discusses only briefly and peripherally. For in Spinoza toleration has primarily to do with individual freedom, not a coexistence of Churches, and still less the freedom of ecclesiastical structures to increase their followings, expand their resources, and build up their educational establishments. [266]
Indeed, Spinoza thought that it would be within the purview of the civil power to limit the size of churches, precisely to prevent them from accumulating an overplus of power in relation to the civil authority which could be used to undermine individual freedoms. He proposes a state religion, which would essentially consist in a philosophical creed designed to provide law with the aura of majesty and authority. Spinoza’s main concern was individual freedom, and so he deprecated concentrations of power which could diminish freedom of individual thought and expression. He was particularly suspicious of ecclesiastical concentrations of power in the hands of clerical castes who had what people considered to be divinely sanctioned and thus “a higher form of authority than the sovereign.” For this power, as Spinoza knew, would be used, by the churches, to enforce
… subservience to ecclesiastical authority and theological tenets, since the rival political factions are bound to encourage churchmen on either side to extend their influence over the common people so as to mobilize them against each other, and thereby ‘deprive their subjects of freedom to express their beliefs’. [267]
This, clearly, is a much more radical notion of toleration. Indeed, in the present political situation in the United States we have a fine example of what can happen when religious institutions are permitted to arrogate so much power to themselves that they can in fact challenge the state on issues that should be decided in favour of the rights and freedom of individuals. Spinoza was right to worry about such accumulations of power in the hands of religious leaders, whose symbolical authority and power tends to be more highly respected and deferred to than governmental authority. Thus religious institutions are able, as they are effectively doing in many places in the world today, to subvert individual rights and freedoms, and to plead freedom of conscience and tolerance of religion as the values which enable them to do so. I will be interested to see as I continue Leiter’s book, whether he deals adequately with Spinoza’s concerns.
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I can’t help wondering if Spinoza’s radicalism and individualism arises from his experience as an excommunicated Jew, ie. an outcast from a group that was itself a marginalized minority within Christian Europe.
IANAL but I thought that the point of the law was the opposite. By banning tribal badges the civil authorities are trying to protect religious sensibilities by removing the proximate cause of bigots reactions.
The law also protects women who don’t want to wear the hijab but are forced to by their community.
Apparently, Spinoza’s views on many subjects were an anathema to many in Amsterdam as he was excommunicated from the Synagog there. Einstein, who was ,at best, a Deist, said that he believed in Spinoza’s god.
Precisely, Kevin! That’s why I have so much of a problem with the idea of specifically religious tolerance. This is the form it takes in so many declarations and charters of rights, but it is a mistake, because toleration should be first for the individual, not for the religion. Religions are simply voluntary associations of individuals and are not in themselves the important thing. This is precisely Spinoza’s problem with accumulations of religious power (freedoms), which tend to supersede and therefore subvert individual freedoms.
Issues of religious tolerance aside I really think the french bill is stupid.
“By banning tribal badges the civil authorities are trying to protect religious sensibilities by removing the proximate cause of bigots reactions.”
This seems like victim blaming. If you wear a headscarf the bigots will know you’re a muslim so we’ll just ban the headscarf that way they won’t know your muslim. We wouldn’t accept this kind of reason for say banning short skirts to prevent rape or banning gay student groups to prevent bullying. This seems entirely the wrong way to deal with bigots.
“The law also protects women who don’t want to wear the hijab but are forced to by their community.”
This argument I’m more sympathetic to. While it will accomplish this I’m not really convinced this is the best way to accomplish this in the long run either. You’d probably be better off trying to work with moderate and liberal elements in the muslim community to try to create a cultural change rather then trying to force one legislatively.
I don’t see why the French bill should be considered stupid. It has the support of a number of high profile Muslims or ex-Muslims, Salman Rushdie, for instance, Wafa Sultan, Tarek Fatah. Ayaan Hirsi Ali thinks it focuses on too narrow a range of concerns about Islam in the democracies, and perhaps it does. But it seems that she would be willing to support more extensive laws governing the way Muslims behave in democratic countries.
Moreover, in response to Leiter’s claim, that the law expresses the general French antipathy to Muslims, the fact that it makes it less likely that that antipathy will be expressed is certainly a reason for thinking otherwise. In addition, let me just point out that not only does this protect women who don’t want to wear the hijab; it also protects women who live near large concentrations of traditional Muslims. The hijab and especially the burqa are very threatening for non-Muslim women who live in areas where many Muslim women wear either, though especially the burqa.
The burqa, in particular, focuses on women’s sexuality. They may call it modesty, but women are covered precisely because they are sexual, and their sexuality is not only a distraction but thought of as a deliberate trap set for men, which men cannot resist. It is also a symbol of ownership. Women are owned by men, controlled by men, subordinate to men. So Muslim men tend to look upon unveiled women as prostitutes or the equivalent, and sexually available, even in societies where it is well known that most women are not veiled. I know a woman who lived in a student housing area where all Muslim women wore the burqa, and she found the men very threatening in their attitude, expressed by their aloofness, by the “stare”, and also by the way they simply took possession of her front yard, and even leaned on and talked over her car in her driveway.
The fact that so many surrounding houses were curtained all the time, and the women sequestered in their houses, only seen when making a dash from house to car, made it impossible for this woman to use her back yard comfortably or to live as she would ordinarily have done in other circumstances. There are a lot of minuses to the wearing of distinctively religious clothing. It is, in many cases, an expression of religio-cultural power, quite aside from its function of keeping women in subjection and clearly expressing the Muslim devaluing of women.
I have no antipathy (certainly no conscious antipathy) towards Muslims as such, but I do towards Islam and many of its practices. I think Islam, uncontrolled in its aggregations of power, just as Roman Catholicism, can be detrimental to democracy and individual freedoms. I personally see no conflict between laws which regulate public expression of religion and individual freedoms, for this is precisely, as Spinoza pointed out, what religious accumulations of power do, that is, to limit and restrict the scope of individual freedoms. Freedom of religion (as such) is, in my view, a mistake. Freedom of individuals would include the freedom of individuals to join religious organisations and to hold religious beliefs, but it would not permit religious organisations to express belief in such a way as to restrict individual freedoms.
I don’t recall claiming you had any antipathy or other motives and I agree to a large extent with the problems with these religious clothing. What I’t not convinced is that a legal ban is the best step towards addressing this rather then say promoting a more grassroots change.
Has “religious freedom” ever been considered to be a right of religious organisations, rather than of religious individuals?
I suspect there is a difference between toleration and respect (and the difference may be further coloured by the usage of those words in your part of the world).
I can see the social value of tolerating an individual’s religious beliefs – in this case meaning that individuals can believe what they wish, but not behave how they wish beyond a socially acceptable limit.
Religions (or their spokespeople) often demand respect. In this case the dynamic flows in the other direction with the implication that whatever a religion says or does is acceptable by default, and the concerns of people outside that faith are unimportant
Perhaps we should tolerate an individual’s beliefs (up to a point) but refuse to respect them (at all)?.
I’ve never understood how Christians square this with Jesus’s prohibition on oaths in Matthew 5: 33-36.
Michaeld. No, I never suggest that you claimed any such thing. It just occurred to me that I might have, and so I gave the matter some consideration. I understand your reservations, too, about laws that might be taken to restrict individual freedoms. Laws banning religious dress in public places would, I think, however, tend to have a largely beneficial aspect, especially for those forms of dress which are in themselves designed to take away individual freedoms, which seem to me not only vital to be supported, but vital for people coming to — well, to Canada, in my case — to learn, if they are to learn about values of equality of men and women, something that is not even well understood by Christians, let alone by many other religious groups with fairly large immigrant populations.
Well, coelsblog, I think, if you listen to what the USCCB is saying, and the way religious freedoms are understood in the US, there is a tendency to think of religious freedom as applying first to institutions and then, correlatively, to individuals, as members of those institutions. Tax laws which exempt religious institutions from taxes, for example, seem to be related to the idea of religious freedom. The problem is that religion is, almost by definition, institutional. Anything else is a philosophical life view or something of that sort. Religions are institutions, first, and they have members, so it is hard to separate institutional recognition when considering questions of religious freedom. In Canada, for instance, where some provinces have large Catholic school systems funded by the public purse, freedom of religion is closely allied to the right of institutions to pass on their traditions to children. But I have not studied the issue. It’s a good question.
Hi Eric, I’m surprised that anyone would argue that religious freedom is primarily a right of institutions. This and similar rights are usually taken as individual rights, and then the general right of individuals to form and join associations extends this to churches. I wouldn’t have thought that tax exemptions rest on “religious freedom” but more on the principle of tax exemption for charities. Certainly in the UK the promotion of religion is written into the law as one of the major categories of charitable activity.
Certainly, though, most Christians totally misunderstand the concept of religious freedom, seeing it as granting them extra rights than the secular person would have. In fact, religious freedom merely means one does not have fewer rights. Thus if you have a general right to do something (such as meet together in a building on Sunday and sing songs) then one cannot be prohibited from doing that owing to its religious content.
Thus, religious freedom merely means that the state cannot suppress particular religious views or activities (e.g. it can’t allow all such activity unless it is Catholic). This explains your question of why have religious toleration. It is merely a specific case of a more general freedom of thought, speech and association. Since it doesn’t grant any extra rights it dosn’t need any specific justification.
For anyone interested, I wrote a blog post on why I think that “religious freedom” is generally misunderstood. http://coelsblog.wordpress.com/2012/10/08/christians-dont-understand-religious-freedom/
I really don’t see any value in tolerating or respecting peoples’ religious beliefs, or any beliefs for that matter. I see an immense value in tolerating and respecting other people. My level of tolerance and respect for another is based largely on how the treat others, not on what they believe. I see some value in tolerating and respecting institutions, since they’re made of people, but only to the extent they behave well. Institutions should not be tolerated or respected simply because they are persistent or powerful.
I’m an atheist and don’t expect any theist to tolerate or respect any of my beliefs. On the other had I do demand that they tolerate my right to hold my beliefs and to grant me the respect I’m due based on my actions, just I as I extent the same to them.
Disagreement is neither intolerant nor disrespectful of people, and I won’t back down from disagreement in the name of either,.
But of course we shall all tolerate the bishops buying up all the hospitals.
And I just don’t think forcing the change through legalistic means is helpful. You can’t legislate people to respecting women. I’d rather see work to address the underlying sexist elements on the culture then ban articles of clothing and hope it filters down. The clothing is just a symptom of the underlying anti women sentiments where the real effort should be spent.
Yes you do expect theists to tolerate your beliefs! (That means you expect them to allow your beliefs to be voiced without trying to censor them by treats of violence or by making them illegal.) Tolerance and respect are very different things, and the words should not be used as though they mean much the same, as you have done. The distinction is important.