Since Jerry Coyne has been up to his old tricks, and dismissing free will as an illusion, I simply feel compelled to answer. Whether this is done freely or not I cannot say, but it seems like a decision that I made myself, and then carried out. Whether it will issue in a published post or not is anyone’s guess, since some of my prospective posts can still be found littering the Drafts bin. I haven’t yet decided whether to keep them or to incinerate them, but whether or not doing so will be done freely or by compulsion is still, it seems, disputable. For at least Massimo Pigliucci disputes it over at Rationally Speaking, where he takes Jerry to task for (i) misunderstanding the philosophical arguments about free will, and (ii) misrepresenting the scientific findings of Libet and others. Jerry responds to Pigliucci in the post linked above. Pigliucci’s post is a response to an earlier op-ed piece that Jerry did for USA Today, published, significantly or ominously, on New Years Day 2012.
It’s hard to know where to start, but since I have to choose to start somewhere let it be right here where I am asking myself where to start. Should I start with Jerry’s original USA Today essay? Or should I start with Pigliucci’s response? Let’s see now! No, I think I’ll start with Jerry’s response to Pigliucci’s response to Jerry! And in particular to this:
But I am addressing what I think is most people’s notion of free will, which I think is to some extent dualistic.
Massimo had said something to the effect that Jerry ignores what philosophers have to say about free will, and that the issue is far more complex than Jerry allows. In response Jerry says that he is using “most people’s notion of free will.” I guess I have to ask how often this move can be allowed? When atheists address religious faith they say, perhaps appropriately, that they are not particularly interested in what theologians have to say, but how the average religious person understands religious faith. I am sympathetic to this response. However, I wonder whether there is anything that could be called “most people’s notion of free will,” and whether it would be helpful if there were.
I do not think, to be candid, that it is possible to cash this notion of free will in the terms that Jerry used in his USA Today article. There he says this:
… let me define what I mean by “free will.” I mean it simply as the way most people think of it: When faced with two or more alternatives, it’s your ability to freely and consciously choose one, either on the spot or after some deliberation. A practical test of free will would be this: If you were put in the same position twice — if the tape of your life could be rewound to the exact moment when you made a decision, with every circumstance leading up to that moment the same and all the molecules in the universe aligned in the same way — you could have chosen differently.
Now, I don’t think the ordinary notion of free will can be unpacked with this level of detail. I think that ordinarily people just think that when they choose to do something they choose to do something, and while they’re doing it they can say something like, “Yeah, I know that I would ordinarily have chosen chocolate, but today I choose this.” In other words, the options are there, and they make a choice. Rewinding the tape to the exact moment when you made a decision is not the issue. The issue is that I could choose either chocolate or orange pineapple right now, and I choose plain chocolate.
Now, I think Massimo is correct when he says that Jerry is making a metaphysical assumption. Jerry says that the denial of free will follows logically from the laws of physics. The brain is made up of particles, and those particles obey the laws of physics, so the possibility of choice is ruled out. Everything is determined by the laws of physics. Now this seems to me a completely unwarranted assumption. Why cannot the laws of physics still operate with deterministic predictability, and yet decisions not be the outcome of those laws? I suspect that what is happening here is that categories are being confused. Indeed, at one point this seems obvious. In his response to Massimo, Jerry says this:
Philosophers may have given up dualism, but my experience discussing this issue with others, including my biology colleagues, shows that almost without exception they have an unconscious dualism: that somehow we have some capacity to step inside our minds and influence their workings. [my italics]
Now, dualism is normally the assumption that there are two kinds of entity in reality, minds and brains, consciousness and body. And the assumption is that minds are the kinds of thing that we are inside and whose workings we do influence. No one, to my knowledge, has yet provided an adequate explanation for consciousness (or mind). I think it is reasonable to suppose that consciousness is an emergent property of brains, but it is not altogether clear to me that it follows that everything that happens in consciousness is causally determined by the motion of particles in the brain, or can simply be reduced to the motion of those particles. Indeed, it seems to me (at least in some moods) that it doesn’t strictly make sense to suppose that this is true.
As Massimo Pigliucci says, Jerry’s denial of free will depends upon some unargued assumptions,
… including the following: causal closure (i.e., that the currently known laws of physics encompass the totality of causal relationships in the universe); a working concept of causality (one of the most thorny philosophical concepts ever); physical determinism (which appears to be contradicted by physics itself, particularly quantum mechanics); and the non-existence of true emergent properties (i.e., of emergent behavior that actually is qualitatively novel, and doesn’t simply appear to be so because of our epistemic limitations). I have opinions about all four of these points, but I don’t have a knockdown argument concerning any of them. The point is, neither does Jerry.
In response Jerry says, regarding emergent properties:
As for emergent properties, those too must obey the laws of physics, unless you hypothesize an “emergent property of free will” that is somehow physically unconnected with lower-level processes. Yes, there are emergent properties that cannot be predicted from knowing about their constituents (the wetness of water may be one), but that wetness still must conform to the laws of physics obeyed by its constituent molecules. The properties of water do not thereby become free from the laws of physics.
But Massimo spoke of “emergent behavior that actually is qualitatively novel, and doesn’t simply appear to be so because of our epistemic limitations.” Has Jerry shown that such emergent behaviour is impossible? No, not clearly. (Notice that I did not say “clearly not”.) Indeed, as he acknowledges, there does, in fact, seem to be qualitatively novel emergent properties of brains, since we all have what he calls the “illusion” of free will, but simply supposing that it is only an illusion that we have the ability to choose is really to beg the question that Pigliucci is asking. The same kind of imponderable questions seem to arise when we talk about consciousness as well. Is it inconceivable that natural selection should have hit upon an entirely novel kind of causation which made us the supremely successful species that we are? Jerry has not shown that it has not, nor that it could not.
The problem, though, is deeper. We can now identify people who clearly had no choice, but were compelled to act as they did because of organic problems with their brains, say, such as the Texas shooter who had a brain tumour, and we can understand, and in some measure, we can sympathise with someone who felt compelled to do something that he knew to be very wrong. The problem is that we are using the language of freedom and choice in the wrong register. We are supposing that our moral language, or our language of choice, depends upon some answer to the questions which Pigliucci asks and Jerry Coyne begs. Jerry thinks the philosopher’s response to the problem, by, as he says, redefining free will, is a misrepresentation of the idea of free will of ordinary people. We addressed this briefly above. but this is really irrelevant. What Jerry seems to be saying is that it is vital that we show that we do not have free will in this ordinary sense — which I do not think is ordinary at all, but a highly developed sense of what free will must be to really be free will — if we are to live fully human lives. Indeed, knowing that we do not have free will in this sense will lead, Jerry thinks, to a kinder world. I do not think this is true, and I wonder why Jerry thinks it is.
Here is a clear expression of the concerns that Jerry thinks arise if we do not understand that we do not choose what we choose:
The issue of whether we have of free will is not an arcane academic debate about philosophy, but a critical question whose answer affects us in many ways: how we assign moral responsibility, how we punish criminals, how we feel about our religion, and, most important, how we see ourselves — as autonomous or automatons.
I simply cannot understand this, and cannot understand why it poses such a problem. Our moral language is designed to deal with situations in which what is thought of as freedom and autonomy is diminished by various factors, running from age to dementia. Our moral language is, in fact, an expression of our understanding of ourselves as the beings that we are, whether we are metaphysically free or physically determined. To say that we do not choose what we choose, as Sam Harris expresses it, is simply a confusion. We do choose what we choose, whether or not that choice is determined, and it is a misuse of language to suggest otherwise. It is simply a conceptual confusion.
We think about freedom in the context that is already established by the kinds of animals we are, and by the kinds of cultural software we use, in terms of constraint or freedom. We understand that some people act under constraints of various sorts, whether from brain tumours or the threat of death. To that extent they are not free. But, on the other hand, we have fairly well-developed concepts of freedom and autonomy in relation to the choices that we make. Informed consent is an important concept in medicine, for example, whether or not we are metaphysically free or determined in some undemonstrable metaphysical sense, and to suppose that we are not is to damage our ability to interact effectively with each other in community. To suppose that, in addition to these concepts, we also must have the assurance — or even that it would help to have the assurance — of some other, completely different level of freedom, is simply unintelligible, unless and until some evidence can be provided that we are or are not free in these respects. Such concepts, it seems to me, are entirely irrelevant to the social project or to the ethical project. It may even make it difficult to know what is meant by the idea of acting for reasons, or accepting that an argument is true because the premises are true and imply the conclusion. I am not an expert in this field, but it seems to me that toying with it in ways that suggest that we are not free in ways that count may in fact be destructive of what it means to be human. I cannot see how the outcome of this particular train of argument can lead to a kinder world.
I have doubts about those “unargued assumptions” in the quote from Massimo:
Causal closure: does any physicist think that we already know the complete set of natural laws? Surely not. What is plausible, and sufficient for Jerry’s argument, is that the ultimate laws are of the same kind as those we do know.
A working concept of causality: surely both sides in the argument presume that we have that? If not, there are problems for both sides.
Physical determinism: yes, quantum mechanics appears inconsistent with this. But if some events in my brain are influenced by random subatomic processes, how does that give me more control over my decisions? I have no choice about those events.
Emergent properties: I have trouble understanding what is meant by “qualitatively novel”. The appearance of a rainbow is qualitatively very different from the properties of all the water molecules and photons involved, but does anyone think it is not determined by those properties?
This has been troubling me for months, and I think Jerry’s re-run of the tape is important. I find the following example best illustrates the point, and I can’t remember if it was mentioned before:
If a choice was made to buy a chocolate ice cream rather than vanilla, would a different choice be made, if Jerry’s tape was re-run a say a hundred times?
Free choice would mean there would be a split in the choice between the two flavours in the re-runs, say 50-50. But if all physical factors stayed the same, would there be such a split, or would there always be one choice?
For there to be a split, there must be a mechanism to override those factors.
I tend to agree with Jerry coyne on this.
David, you seem to be missing my point. Jerry’s assumptions are not sufficient to make his case about determinism, but, even if they were, the point still remains that there are different levels of discourse going on here. In one we are speaking scientifically. In another we are speaking about human actions, behaviour and moral responsibility. It makes no sense to speak of there being no moral responsibility, because that has a perfectly legitimate role to play in the language, whatever the metaphysical imponderables turn out to be. We simply have no basis upon which to make a decision regarding the metaphysics, and no scientific basis to reach the conclusions that Jerry reaches. But alongside that we have the ongoing human project with its language and its descriptions, in which we distinguish between free and unfree, informed consent and compulsion, constraint and liberty. This is not based on any metaphysical assumptions, It is simply part of the ongoing project of being human. Say that all this is determined if you like, the language of freedom and compulsion, mental incapacity and autonomy is still a going concern within that project. What purpose is served by saying that we do not choose what we choose? I don’t get it. Philosophically, it’s a nonstarter. In terms of the way we arrange our lives and relationships it’s irrelevant. What point is being made?
Basees, as I said to David, I don’t think it matters, one way or the other. There is no answer to the question, so there is no way to conclude one way or another. If you speak about analogy, then the theologians will say: Yes, and we use analogy too, to show that God exists. It’s best to leave imponderables alone, until there is some reason to conclude one way or the other. Since there is no way to falisify or verify the conclusion, there is nothing more to be said. Meanwhile, however, we still have our language of freedom and autonomy, constraint, compulsion and indecision, and this is something that is still in the process of development (or evolution, if you like). What is the point of saying that we do not choose? We do choose in the only sense in which it makes sense to speak about choice. If I ask you what you want, and you say chocolate, then you have chosen chocolate. Why is this a problem? The freedom that matters is all we need. But if you begin saying that our lives are determined anyway, what’s to stop someone saying, “So, it doesn’t really matter, whether you are forced by your genes or by me?” I think it does matter, and that’s where the language of freedom and choice belong.
I would say that in terms of the basic science Jerry has the upper hand. There is no way to incorporate his common notion of free will (which I accept) in our current model of the universe.
Consciousness may be an emergent property, that is to say “this is what it feels like to live inside a brain”. But free will cannot be in the same sense, since it requires that ‘I’ can overcome the basis constraints of determinism to _select_ chocolate where I would otherwise have selected vanilla, i.e. for the upper level to affect the lower level; for the perceived rainbow to affect the water molecules and photons that constitute it.
You claim, Eric, that “We do choose what we choose, whether or not that choice is determined”. I would reword this statement to allow discussion with less ambiguity “We do choose what we select”, so that we can distinguish the act (choosing) from the outcome (selection).
Then (ii) I would say that if the choice is determined (as you allow) and could therefore be simulated on a computer which contained a model of your brain state and all its stimuli, such that it would not be necessary to ask you the question directly (which I believe is entailed), then you could not be said to have free will.
If that were the case (as I believe) then each individual is in fact a robot pacing out their pre-determined course.
Finally, you said, “it seems to me that toying with it in ways that suggest that we are not free in ways that count may in fact be destructive of what it means to be human. ”
I totally agree with you here. Despite my firm belief that from a physical point of view free will is an illusion, I say that it makes no sense to use this this fact when ‘deciding’ how to live my life. At the very least the actions that I undertake affect the enviroment for me and everyone else which will alter there behaviours regardless of whether or not they are ‘free’.
Here is my post on Jerry’s article, “Why you don’t really have free will”: http://canadianatheist.com/2012/01/18/coincidence-or-physics/
I tend to side with Jerry over free will. As far as I can tell our actions and thoughts depend on our biochemistry, which depends on chemistry, which depends on physics. If there is ‘something else’ which enables ‘free will’, how does ‘it’ work? How could we test for ‘it’?
While Massimo Pigliucci says that he is a philosophical naturalist he only seems to offer criticism of Jerry’s arguments. In my opinion it is up to the philosophers/theologians/scientists who think there is ‘free will’ to
a) define ‘free will’
b) suggest a falsifiable test
… if only because the more we come to understand the natural world the more sufficient natural explanation appears to be.
I interpreted Jerry to mean that we’d have to take the retributive aspect out of justice, and just work in a dispassionate way to restrain dangerous people and provide deterrents. For example, supporters of the death penalty could no longer rationally get away with saying “Scum of the earth, he deserves to die” – an unedifying sentiment – because it’s about as meaningful as saying that my computer deserves to be thumped when it crashes at an awkward moment. We would probably end up imprisoning people for the same crimes as we do now, but it might take some of the hate out of the process. In fact, as you say, we have been working in this direction this for a long time already – we already acknowledge that certain forms of brain damage can have striking, systematic effects on behaviour, and we also know, though we haven’t really acted on the awareness, that people’s behaviour can be very much hostage to their genes.
I’m sure Jerry would agree that “whether you are forced by your genes or by me?” does matter, since we don’t experience ‘ourselves’ as being forced by our genes (of course our genes are really part of ourselves). But we could perhaps use the knowledge that none of us in the end have choices to feel less angry with and vindictive towards each other. It works for me!
To returning to an earlier part of your post. In Jerry’s model, which I believe is the neuroscience paradigm, the laws of physics acting on the material brain lead to the outcome ‘experience chocolate/orange pineapple ice cream dilemma’, and then to the outcome ‘chocolate’; they can’t lead to a ‘chocolate’/'orange pineapple’ junction in which something else can take over from the laws of physics and make the final decision. I can’t at present think of any non-mystical way in which the brain could have a ‘something else’ to choose the direction at that junction, where the ‘something else’ is independent of the laws of physics. I agree with Jerry that this isn’t consistent with the way I was brought up to think of free will. In my pre-naturalism conception of free will, it wouldn’t have been possible to foresee every decision I could make in advance. To treat the brain as a computer subject to the laws of physics, on the other hand, is to say that if we knew all of the inputs into it (including memories) and understood all of the processing it was doing, then one could work out what the outputs would be (probabilistically, if they are governed by probabilistic quantum processes – but that is still obeying the laws of physics and not the laws of the mysterious ‘something else’).
The concept of “Free Will” is simple, it has the sole purpose to justify punishment (revenge), particularly eternal punishment (revenge for the impotent). It is always a cohort of the (“Immortal”) “Soul”. If you understand that there is no “Soul” then you already understand that there is no “Free Will”.
Well, I changed my mind about free will only recently, and I follow Eric’s line of reasoning much the same way. I made what I considered a categorical mistake, confusing the language of consciousness and the language of physics. It’s a pretty profound mistake, because ignoring the mind and concentrating on physics gives a false picture of the world, as purely materialistic where minds or consciousness don’t exist.
Minds do exist, at least they can’t be proved naturalistically, and hence mind does fall outside the normal methodology of natural science. It does not fall outside the methodologies of philosophy or psychology, and so there is no reason to abandon all hope.
Also, humans are rather unique when it comes to the idea of free-will, hence we don’t really observe it much at all in the rest of the natural animal kingdom.
And the reason why it is important to recognize the categorical mistake of overlooking consciousness is that, as Eric suggests, it is bound up with morality and the importance of human values. In my opinion, morality can’t exist unless we have free-will, and everything important about humanity seems to disappear into the trash. That’s how important free-will is.
I fully accept naturalism, but I find the rewind-to-decision-point metaphor incoherent. If everything about the world is the same in the rerun, then the “I” in the rerun is the same too, in mood, mental images and so on – and is going to make the same decision. So what? It doesn’t change the experience of finding oneself at a decision point, the way in which the need to make a decision can be felt as burdensome: consider the decision by a sober alcoholic whether to take a drink.
I would caricature this argument in dialogue form:
I don’t have any trouble explaining the illusion of free will: it follows naturally from the fact that we don’t have perfect knowledge of the factors that will influence our decisions in the future.
I can be reasonably sure that at some point in the next half hour I will either have a shower or have breakfast, but I don’t know which because I don’t know whether my hunger or my sense of discomfort at being dirty will prove to be stronger. So my ‘map’ of my future is indeterminate. But this has nothing to do with the fact that the decision, when I finally make it, will have been deterministically caused. I can ‘see’ myself either showering or having breakfast, so from my current perspective I regard these as options which are feasibly open to me; whereas, say, being seduced by a beautiful Russian spy is not.
Clearly a naive contra causal free will doesn’t work, and a deterministic free will means we are not causa sui, so we aren’t responsible ultimately for our actions. But I don’t think this means the idea is worthless. In a world where there are agencies it makes sense to assume a sort of free will, because the behaviour of agencies can be affected by others, in a way that the behaviour of inanimate objects cannot.
A pinball falls according to the laws of physics, but can be affected by flippers, nudges and so on – all deterministic. If we imagine a pinball that is able to direct itself, as animal agencies can, so that rather than bashing it with flippers we persuade it to operate its internal flippers, then we surely have a meaningful notion of free will – it’s entirely deterministic but recognises that the pinball has agency to affect its movements through internal “flippers”. We can blame a pinball for falling in a hole whether it has agency or not, but if it doesn’t have agency there is no point in remonstrating with it. Can’t free will just be the recognition of this difference between animate and inanimate objects – that something is worth remonstrating with?
Needless to say, I find all the comments interesting, and some of them puzzling. Let me start with Discovered Joy (#7), who says this:
This is related to Felix’s comment (#5), so we might as well have that too:
The problem here, as I see it, is that Jerry doesn’t provide any evidence either, so scientifically, he doesn’t have the upper hand. We can’t test for either freedom or unfreedom. There is no prediction that we can make that is falsifiable. So, scientifically, Jerry is still not on solid ground.
The next problem is the one of retributive justice. Tige Gibson puts it most clearly:
In fact, this is not true. The question of whether punishment should be retributive is something we can discuss quite independently of the question of free will. Religion does not demand retributive punishment. In fact,As Paul very clearly says in his letter to the Romans:
So, free will or not free will, religion does not necessarily think of it as a license to punish retributively. Indeed, one problem with assuming that our wills are not free is the fact that it may occur to us that if punishment fitted the crime it might be a greater deterrent, and would therefore commend itself to those who believe that our actions are tightly determined. It would not follow, in other words, that belief in determinism would bring about a kinder world. And if BF Skinner is anything to go by, it would not be a more human world either.
In general, it seems to me, a strict determinism which implied that, at the point of decision between alternatives the choice of one over the others is completely deterministic, and the choice is just an illusion, would also mean that the whole matter of choosing on the basis of reasons is meaningless. Do we, or do we not, choose for reasons? I think we do. We choose one conclusion of a syllogism, because it is validly inferred from its premises. It is hard to think why we should assume that, if every choice is determined, for we might just as well have been determined to choose another, though invalid, inference. The same goes for choice between chocolate and vanilla (or orange pineapple, which I despise). I am not saying that I or anyone else is the absolute originator of a choice, since my choice is based on so many other things in my history which have a causal impact now. But I am saying that meaning mediates choice, insofar as an act can be entirely determined in the physical sense, and yet free in the sense that, while some output is determined, the output is mediated by an ability to choose one thing over another. It may be that this is an illusion, but there is no reason in physics why it must be. All that physics determines is inputs and outputs. Put a mind in between and there may easily be a range of outputs each of which would fulfil all the requirements of physics, but amongst which the mind has the ability to choose. I do not see how Jerry has the upper hand in this context, if all that we are speaking about is the satisfaction of the laws of physics. What necessitates that one of the options is determined?
My point is simply that no scientific case has yet been made here, and it is, from the scientific point of view, illegitimate to conclude, without evidence, that it has been. Here faith comes in in such a way as to call into question its scientific credentials, for the assumption that the very same laws apply to conscious or sentient beings as apply to physical particles seems, on the face of it, a leap of faith for which there is as yet no decisive evidence — which, as I understand Pigliucci’s argument, is all that he is saying.
But I repeat that I am considering another dimension too, which, though briefer, was the focus of my post. There are levels of discourse involved here. Saying that I do not choose what I choose is saying that the language of choice and responsibility is without meaning. But this is just what philosophers like Dennett (Elbow Room, Freedom Evolves) or PF Strawson (“Freedom and Resentment”) seem to me to be denying. There are different levels or contexts of discourse in which the languge of responsibility and choice makes perfect sense, so that it is needlessly ambiguous to say that we do not choose what we choose.
And this is why, of course, Dennett thinks that freedom evolves, because, in fact, in the process of evolution, the structure of deciding and choosing becomes more and more sensitive and complex, so that we do have all the freedom that really matters. If this doesn’t, as Jerry suggests, square with the ordinary concept of free will, then so much the worse for the ordinary concept. However, although I say this with the greatest respect, one can only drink at the ordinary concept spring so often before it begins to look like a diversionary tactic, and a refusal to consider the evidence. If Jerry thinks that the philosophical “redefinition” of free will is illegitimate, he must say why. He can’t just keep repeating the mantra about the laws of physics, since he has no falsifiable theory to present about the presence or absence of free will, laws of physics or not. In order to understand it, then, we must come at it in another way.
Besides, there is something fairly unique about consciousness and the ability of human consciousness to achieve a sense of objectivity. As Thomas Nagel points out, our abilities somehow to get outside of our consciousness and achieve objective truth about the world is a remarkable and unexplained phenomenon (see The View from Nowhere). Indeed, it is so remarkable that it seems that the leap of faith required to apply the laws of physics to it (simpliciter) seems a matter of apples and oranges.
Finally, notice I do not come to conclusions. All I am saying, or intended to say, is that we just don’t know, and, as scientists like Jerry Coyne or Richard Dawkins or Lawrence Krauss are fond of saying, it’s okay to say you don’t know. I think that’s what we should be saying in respect to freedom and free will, until we do.
Mark Jones… Your comment crossed mine. I should add that nothing I have said bespeaks a contra-causal theory of free will. Mind is too tightly linked to brain for that. But this doesn’t mean that, from amongst a bunch of options, I cannot choose one, even though the whole process is deterministic.
I think your understanding of what we mean by choice, Eric, is absolutely correct. Re-run the tape, and as someone else has said, since the conditions are the same, there is no reason why one would not make the same decision (no, there would be no coin-tossing odds of 50-50). But surely, in real life, most people have made a decision that, having learnt some new fact, they have rescinded (having not yet put that decision into irreparable action, so to speak). Or they have realised that they would not have made a certain decision had they had access to a piece of information that came to light subsequent to their decision. Yes, in the end, I should say that what we do is determined: by, yes, our physical structure, by our nature as animals, by the kind of person we are, with the faults and virtues we have, by our upbringing and our beliefs, by the situations we find ourselves in… anyone who has undertaken a bit of introspection about how decisions are arrived at must surely realise what a murky business it is; but it is jumping the gun, being greedily reductionist (as Dennett calls it), to assert that it is all readily reducible to neurons firing in the brain and therefore everything not readily reducible to the physical reality of the brain is somehow merely illusory. Alex Rosenberg (hope I’ve got the name right) in The Atheist’s Guide to Reality asserts that by writing his book he is merely rearranging neuronal networks in his readers’s brains as if this is saying something of importance: of course understanding something new will involve a rearrangement of neurons – and so what? – but that doesn’t mean that what is happening is somehow not understanding.
The interesting question to me is not whether we have free will or not, but the nature of our activity, or, more broadly, the nature of human beings that has allowed them to create, for example, the great edifice of science.
And there is surely no guarantee that a disbelief in free will is going to lead to greater kindness, which is something of a fond belief among the anti-free will crowd. Why should it? Why should it lead to a kinder treatment of criminals? Draconian punishments of criminals would surely rearrange the neurons of would-be criminals rather better than light, ‘non-retributive’ sentences and deter crime better. Read Bulgakov’s diaries and see what Stalin’s terror did to people’s minds. And what of psychopaths? One can certainly imagine psychological tests being devised to catch dangerous psychopaths early in life… ‘We are very sorry, Mr and Mrs Smith, but your son is going to have to be put down.’ Biologists are far from having an unblemished record where the treatment of human beings other than themselves (eugenics, Konrad Lorenz…), and there is no reason to suppose that biologist-kings would be any better than Plato’s philosopher-kings.
I don`t feel qualified to take any sides on this debate ( my sympathies tend to the Jerry side) but I have noticed that Jerry and others frequently, after saying that there is no free will, follow up by saying that its absence should persuade us to be more forgiving of, e.g. criminal behaviour. Is this not a bit contradictory? Our feelings will be what they will be.
Of course under the `many worlds` theory there is still no actual `free will` but, as ALL decisions are made and acted upon we can literally have our cake and eat it.
This is one of the dangers of falling too far out of scepticism into a dogmatic version of naturalism or materialism (or positivism or scientism). Yes, we all despise the attacks made by fundamentalism and evangelicalism against science, especially evolution, but that does not mean that we must take up a dogmatic position to oppose them.
The problem with challenging free-will, or ‘personal choice’ is that it has enormous political and ethical consequences in doing so. You better have good reasons to promote the idea that free-will is all nonsense, and that we’re only atoms and energy and nothing else. And of course there is no reason to believe that free-will is religious in origin.
And I’ve suggested that new atheism is not really about science or naturalism, but about ethics and politics, a sort of liberalism. I’m much more convinced that this is really the core behind new atheism, especially now the attacks against freedom of speech resonates strongly among the atheist community.
I am strongly in favour of challenging or dissenting views, and there is no problem in questioning the idea of free-will, even though it is self-evident that we have free-will, but to take a dogmatic stance and tell people they have no free-will is not only against reason, but erodes some very important values that form the foundation of free-thought.
Hey Egbert, gotta point out that it is self evident that the earth does not move.
Just a few short quotations from Ronald Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs
This is the point that I was trying to make above, though much more succinctly expressed, and the claim that you do not choose what you choose is merely a piece of obfuscation, because, as Dworkin points out,
– except, of course, in very banal matters where choice is unimportant.
In other words, Brian, while it may be self-evident that the earth does not move — what, I wonder, would it look like if it did? — in other words, from our perspective, moving and not moving look identical — it is not a matter that you can ignore, in a context where a decision is called for, that there are better and worse decisions, and you must choose. It may, for all that, be an illlusion, and consciousness of choice just a parallel epiphenomenon which has no relation to what actually takes place, but in the situation of choice, you much choose. As Dowkin says:
But then it also follows, as Dworkin points out, that we are not able to say that others are not judgementally responsible either, for this would end up in what he calls the recursive nonsense of saying (recursively) that no one makes any responsible decisions, because they are compelled to believe what they believe about …, well, anything, including whether they believe that choice is completely determined, or whether they believe that it is not, and so on, endlessly.
Whilst I can see Jerry’s scientific point of view on free will, I find that intuitively (sorry) I just can’t accept it. Much of this discussion simply goes over my head, but on balance I have to agree with you Eric, for no better reason than it feels right. I’d like to see Jerry come up with a scientific experiment to prove his point.
Off topic, I should like to congratulate you, Eric, on posting the cartoon of Mohammed. In solidarity with the students at UCL, and Rhys Morgan, I’ve changed my Facebook image to the J&M cartoon, and would encourage others to do so as well. I believe that it is vitally important that we do not give in pressure to self censor to appease anyone who chooses to be offended.
Eric,
“In general, it seems to me, a strict determinism which implied that, at the point of decision between alternatives the choice of one over the others is completely deterministic, and the choice is just an illusion, would also mean that the whole matter of choosing on the basis of reasons is meaningless.”
It seems to me the use of the phrase “and the choice is just an illusion” is revealing. A choice is, in the first place, an event. The illusion is that the causes of the event contains an agent with free will, that is, one which acts beyond (or from a vantage point outside of or in addition to) the physical causes leading up to the event. It is therefore incumbent upon advocates of free will to specify this extra element contributing to the event since scientific observations do not require extra-physical involvement in events generally. As a matter of fact, all scientific explanations require that there be no non-physical interventions.
The last phrase: “would also mean that the whole matter of choosing on the basis of reasons is meaningless.”
Of course the event we call choosing has its causal antecedents just like the kiss of billiard balls. Reasons are our assessment of probable outcomes (a large number of kisses). The only sense this becomes meaningless is if you think all events lack meaning. For this to be true, naturally, the universe itself lacks meaning. That’s hard to deny unless we imply the kind of meaning a deity brings to the situation. But meaning can also be defined in terms of our goal seeking.
I think the biggest obstacle to settling the issue of free will is that some are confused by the warm glow of desirable social outcomes or the dim prospect of their potential loss. However, this is a separate issue. Whether you dislike some notion has nothing to say about whether it is true.
BTW, I like Dan Dennett’s analysis:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Utai74HjPJE
This video explores the issue of the psychology of belief in a kind of free will that perhaps can’t be had:
Skip the first 5 minutes (Michael Shermer)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jrCZYDm5D8M
Brian (and others), for me the no free will position leads to a more reflective position about social institutions and social interactions. If we accept that a human being is nothing more than the product of their genes and environment and then internal algorithmic processes within the brain that create complex behavior, we will then pay close attention to the factors that are structuring people. I think such reflections and altering of institutions do override feelings and reactive attitudes about what should happen in certain situations, how punishment should be carried out, for example. Social institutions have been doing that for a long time. Civil punishment by the state is supposed to prevent people from acting on their raw emotion of revenge, for example, changing the way people behave towards someone who has slighted them, perhaps now saying, “the state will take care of it.”
Recognizing that the child in a bad neighborhood born to bad parents with bad genes does not “deserve” to live a life on the margins, simply because she happened to be born into such a situation, is what the no free will position can do. We can ask questions about how to improve their environment (educational theory, sociology, behavioralism, identity theory, etc.) or even ask questions about what we can do to improve their “genes.”
The ideas and theories and understanding you have of the world, things structured by your individual history, determines your “feelings” for the situation before you. Ultimately, no, you do not control what feelings you have about the situation before you. But if your social history had been different or if you start believing in new theories (no-free-willism or God-mercyism), you will have different “feelings” about the situations you encounter. In a similar way, if some neuroscientist shows you full proof that the despicable action of the individual in front of you came because of a brain tumor then your “feelings” toward the situation changes. Instead of saying lock this individual away for the rest of their life, you may say “cut out that tumor.” Similarly instead of saying lock this class of people (miscreants) up, you may say lets make sure this class of people grow up in better neighborhoods, in better families, not in poverty, etc. You may say this individual needs drug rehabilitation not jail, as we already have started doing in many cases.
Thank you, Rick. for these videos which I had never seen before. They are helpful in providing a clearer understanding of what is meant when we speak of free will. As Dennett points out, the definition provided by Wright is in fact not what is meant. I assume that this means that the defintion provided by Jerry Coyne is not what is meant either, because Coyne’s definition also presumes the kind of causal control that defines inevitability of outcomes, and this is not to the point. This comes out clearly in Dworkin’s analysis too. And this is not, as Jerry says, merely a redefinition of free will to avoid the consequences of determinism. It is a nuanced understanding of the kinds of freedom that would be worthwhile. How could it be worthwhile to have causal control over our decisions, as if we were creating the world ab initio? Surely, what we want to do is to act in the world in such a way as to be responsive to the world as it is. The world can be a dangerous place. Therefore we need to be aware of that, and attempt to avoid the harms and pursue the goods, and we will do this in ways that are also consistent with our own nature, for some of which we are not wholly responsible, since our education and development is to a large extent controlled by adults who have conceptions of what harms and goods are, and tend to mould us in such a way as to have a character which acts in relation to the harms and goods that is consistent with this development. But even that is not entirely fixed, and the degree of fixity will depend upon intelligence, which can be defined in terms of our ability to respond accurately to finer and finer details of the environment — which is why Dennett speaks in terms of the evolution of freedom. The point that I have been trying to make is that the question of freedom is so much more complex than simply saying that we are governed by the laws of physics. I think that is what Massimo Pigliucci is trying to say as well.
Eric, as far as the earth moving or not moving, I agree that it requires at least some kind of “theory” or postulation to make the claim either way, though I do think naively our perception encourages a first claim of not moving.
Dworkin, likewise, seems, in an existentialist like way, to make a claim about what our phenomenal perception tells us. His:
“In the first person, deciding requires a judmental responsibility . . . ”
I am not sure there is a necessary connection between what the phenomenal perception of the first person seems and that there is a “judgmental responsbility.” Our bodies/selves will choose or judge something, even doing nothing is a choice or reaction. But the idea of “responsibility” attaching to that, except in the weak sense of responsibility meaning that the “self had to choose something,” does not necessarily follow. Which is where Sartre maddens me as well. There is not a “morality” that arises because of the self being forced to choose. The fact that the self does not understand the determinant structures of the choice (its own historical and brain structures), that the self feels its self choosing absent of any constraint, does not create responsibility in any way. Our social ideas have attached notions of responsibility to that seemingly “free” choice, perhaps for important social reasons. I would say that what we believe, such as Dworkin above, attaches to phenomenal necessity of choice making is a very recent historical and socially constructed belief about responsibility attaching to the choice, perhaps something rising out of the “choosing the righteous path of God,” thus creating the total responsibility of the agent.
Such a choice is only seemingly (radically) free, anyways.
The idea that “responsibility” attaches to the choice is a social and moral construction, a metaphysical and ontological claim that is rather empty, in a similar way that before a good theory of our solar system people made claims that the earth is not moving because it is the homes of the Gods, or something like that, which was equally empty, not just because it was wrong but because it was of bad form.
I think what attaches to “choice” can be better seen when we are not thinking of moral situations. Take your being forced to choose an answer on Jeapordy! as compared to Watson being forced to choose an answer. Say on the final jeapordy clue.
You will make a choice and you will be held responsible as per the rules of the games. A person may even run off the stage in some existentialist expression of their angst or Watson (a computer) may crash (and say no more). Choices and behavior are made, they are part of the algorithm controlling both the human and the computer. Consequences result as others hold them accountable, such as how the game and language games will play out. And there is social “responsibility” in that sense. But such responsibility is not attached to the choice in some absolute sense, it is attached to the societal and envrironmental outcomes of the choice, outcomes that (hopefully and usually) are factored into the self’s previous counterfactual postulations about the future that goes into why that choice is made in the way it is, something that has made humans special.
The game and language game of moral and social responsibility bottoms out in a similar structure. At least that is my rendering.
I can’t dispute this but nevertheless find myself agreeing with Jerry Coyne. We do indeed make decisions, but we are determined entities. I think what Jerry is saying can be misunderstood, and it is reasonable to conclude that the outcomes of that misunderstanding would not be good (this might be what Dennett is getting at), but that doesn’t make him wrong.
In the past, I have unfairly saddled Eric with defeating moral relativism. I do not want to repeat this with defending free will. Please, Eric, do not engage my complaints any further than you wish to. I am in no way entitled to an explanation from you on problems that have troubled philosophy for centuries. My problems are with the wider concepts themselves, and my complaints are not truly directed at you.
That being said, I find discussing free will immensely irritating and unfruitful. The term “free will” is so poorly defined that almost any discussion of it becomes rife with equivocation errors. Of course we “choose what we choose” (how tautological), to say different seems to deny the existence of choice altogether. Yet, opponents of free will never seem to argue that people do not actually think they are making choices. On the other side, defenders of free will often argue that without free will there would be no choices at all. From there, we generally end up in a straw man massacre on both sides that goes nowhere.
I have yet to hear any coherent description that does not rely on the even more nebulous terms such as “consciousness”. All tests of free will I have heard generally require impossible time travel experiments (Jerry’s definition is a fine example of this), or conditions of impossibly vast information that can be applied to a brain. Let me also preemptively require that if the term “consciousness” is to be used we will need a test for determining that as well. In both cases “free will” remains a meaningless term, because the tests are set firmly beyond any possible goalposts. Until a test can be actually carried out can be derived to determine if the source of an action was the product of free will or not, there is not much utility to the term. You very correctly pointed out Jerry’s unjustified leap once the concept of free will was “falsified”, and the religious example of free will not necessarily contingent on determining punishments was also excellent. There is no way to reach those conclusions because there is no important meaning. There is no real benefit to using the concept of free will, it predicts and describes nothing. If we cannot meet empirical wickets, we are doomed to run in philosophical circles.
Abandoning the idea of free will only seems to cause irreparable damage the ad hoc rationalization against the problem of evil. I have not been the least bit troubled by its removal from my thought process.
“The point that I have been trying to make is that the question of freedom is so much more complex than simply saying that we are governed by the laws of physics.”
Is there something extraphysical then?
We can’t provide evidence for the non-existence of God, the “Soul”, “Free Will”, WMD? Seriously?
The need for retributive justice is a symptom of psychological predisposition which is not caused by religion, but some religious groups do behave this way collectively, while others behave in the “turn the other cheek” mode.
In either case, the underlying question is what do you want “Free Will” for? If you un/sub-consciously associate it with the “Soul” then you are essentially looking for immortality. All of this other discussion is evasiveness intended to avoid that point.
You can tell when someone is being evasive when they confound issues. “Free Will” and choice really must be kept in separate tanks. “Free Will” is a presumed property that we supposedly have which determines what we do with choice. We always have more choice than we can even be aware and “Free Will” presumes that we have access to choices that in practicality we do not and this is demonstrable. The availability of choice has no direct bearing on “Free Will”.
All you have to ask is how you came by this “meaning”/”purpose” (words of conspicuous origin). Was it bestowed by God as a “calling” or is it a product of biological and social forces?
A familiar refrain reminding us of where the burden of proof actually lies.
So, it is a leap of faith to consider that something should obey the laws of physics?
Our ability to sense and weigh the difference between choices does evolve, even the weights of choices changes over time, but this (choices in general) have no bearing on “Free Will”. Only if we truly had no choice at all would “Free Will” suddenly be obviously meaningless to everyone. Bringing up the point that choice exists and can be made confuses people, intentionally, to distract them from the actual question. Subjects that are agreed to not possess “Free Will” are able to make choices including computer programs.
As long as I have been an atheist, it has always frustrated me that being hypocritical is the true nature of the religious.
Thank you again, I get it. You believe, we don’t, therefore, it’s our responsibility to prove to you because you are right by default.
Objectivity isn’t that prevalent and certainly comes in degrees, but there isn’t anything “mysterious” about it that it needs some God-granted property to explain it. This really strikes me as very NOMA that science should stay away from “Free Will” because God.
How pseudo-skeptical of you. Because you don’t know, nobody else does. And the fact that you have avoided certain sticking points in order to keep yourself in the “does not know” column means that everyone who “thinks” they know, must be wrong.
Brian, Consciousness is not explained by physics.
Bian, I think Coyne presents the simplest, most straightforward description of materialism. He refuses to become tangled in the complexity of philosophical arguments. Dennett, being a philosopher originally, tends to elaborate. Thus, Dennett is a compatiblist. I happen to think they are both right and so I must be a meta-compatibilist.
“Is there something extraphysical?” I don’t think so. Materialism says there is nothing extraphysical. Complexity does not imply extraphysical. It is just that complexity such as is implied by free will or consciousness often invites confabulation in the direction of the obscure. I am just reading some science history of Steno – a 17th century naturalist who layed the foundations of geology and stratification. The complexity of the evidence at the time lead other scientists to, what we would now regard as, absolutely crazy explanations. I suspect this will seem the case in a hundred years or so regarding consciousness and free will.
Egbert, I think consciousness is one of those very complex notions that is steeped in historical meanings. The problem is, most people seem to believe that because it is complex it must be magical. I am pretty certain that once the brain has been as well explored as the other complex aspects of living things, the magical aspect will have been reduced to the pages of history. See Dennett’s book Consciousness Explained for a tentative explanation.
Actually there is a body of scientific evidence which suggests that most of our choices are made unconsciously (and I would argue deterministically) and we then consciously justify our ‘decision’ retrospectively.
Which means that sometimes our justifications are disjointed from our actions. If you watch social interactions carefully you can see this happening.
Timothy D Wilson has written a book – ‘Strangers to Ourselves’ – which covers a lot of the ground covered in this thread, including a good set of notes and bibliography. Chapter 3 ‘Who’s in Charge’ is particularly apposite.
I’m rather pleased that consciousness is magical. Some people (myself included) find something magical about many experiences, or insights, including scientific or mathematical insights. I would hesitate to call it spiritual, but what else could consciousness be described other than spiritual?
What annoys me so much about religion is that it is very materialistic and non-spiritual, and yet claims to oppose materialism and embrace spirituality. It’s one of the biggest deceptions in history, and people continue to fall for it.
I’ve always had much greater respect for eastern religions precisely because they were more spiritually fulfilling and introspective than monotheism. That they too fall into a kind of self-denialism is why religion is a failure in method for a better humanity.
I’ve always loved science but I’m afraid I’m more a lover of art and the human condition. In a sense art gave birth to religion, and then religion became a kind of obsessive fetish or object external to art, and it became the very opposite of its origin. The legacy of monotheism is still being felt today in our impoverishment and nihilism.
If anything can give us a sense of renewal onto better things, then it could be the magic of consciousness.
Eric, I think I share what you seem to mean by magical. That’s the wonder and appreciation of the good and the beautiful. However, it is in fact a metaphorical magical. Magic is the antithesis of science and is unlikely to provide knowledge. Spiritual too is a very loaded word which always causes confusion in a philosophical discussion. I never use the term because it is associated with anti-scientific attitudes.
Consciousness will not be less wonderful when it is understood in physical detail. It would be wrong to assume that materialism denies wonder and appreciation and art and music and love, etc.
For once I’m having trouble understanding what you are getting at.
Surely the question should be, how could decisions not be the outcome of those laws?
The burden of proof here is with people suggesting that something can happen that is not an outcome of the laws of physics. You need to explain how this would happen, and what is it that overrides the laws of physics.
Why not? Again, what causes consciousness then, if not the particles in the brain?
That’s just an appeal to consequences. You haven’t shown why Coyne is wrong.
Rick, #32, don’t you mean Egbert when you speak about magic? Nothing that I have said suggests that I think consciousness is magic or mysterian. I do, however, think that science has by no means said the last word here.
Sorry folks, I’ve been away for half a day, and won’t be able to give your responses the “full” treatment.
I guess I don’t see the problem with determination and freedom. (I agree that “free will” is poorly defined, and perhaps part of the problem with disagreement over this matter.) I said that I see no problem in the will being free and yet the world being deterministic. Suppose we come to a point of decision. We can do A or B. Deterministic causality would be fully satisfied by either. What happens in between is consciousness, mind, decision. I choose A. In what way is that unfree? And why should it be thought that it is somehow the unique, predictable outcome of inputs and outputs? As Dennett says, we are great avoiders. So we canmake a choice. But determinism doesn’t say that only one outcome is possible. It just says that there are causal relationships between events, which explain them. When we see an animal hesitating over whether or not to enter into a fight with a rival, and then see him slink away, the situation seems to be that, given all the inputs, he might have done either, but thought living to fight again another dayy is preferable. Even that is choice. Where there are options, there cannot be strict predictability, but it doesn’t mean that we are any the less free, even if the choices we make are “unconscious,” that is, not put into explicit terms at the time. And that’s only a very simply example of a choice situation. Many involving human beings are far more complex, require far more thought and reflection, and consider even more consequences of action — whether it will affect my job, my standing in society, whether others will respect or condemn me, whether my significant other will be able to understand and accept that I have acted in a certain way, whether this is consistent with my life as heretofore lived, and maybe many other things besides, not all of them explicitly considered, but still weighing in the decision. To suppose that this is just a matter of inputs and outputs seems hopelessly simplistice, besides the fact that it attempts to reduce a complex social situation to physics. Not only does this not make sense, it is even incoherent. I simply don’t see how we have come to the point where it seems adequate to say that particles move according to the laws of physics therefore we don’t choose, and the feeling that we do is all illusion.
Of course, causation is involved at every point in some way. It’s not that we jump out of causal series of events, but that we fit them in such a way as to provide a measure of discretion to the individual. That’s what minds are for, I assume, and not just to be epiphenomenal traces of causal chains working mechanically elsewhere.
I find one of the most useful discussions of this topic to be Ronald Dworkin’s discussion of “Free Will and Responsibility” in his book Justice for Hedgehogs. Needless to say, Dennett’s books on free will Freedom Evolves and Elbow Room are also vital. But the issues that they raise are simply not dealt with by saying that the brain is made up of physical particles, therefore QED.
Skeptico, you say that
I do not see why this is the burden of proof at all (even though I have suggested that, in the case of consciousness the outcome of the laws of physics is not deterministic). The burden of proof is on someone either to produce evidence that causality works like this in relation to consciousness, or provides a philosophical argument that considers the conceptual issues surrounding an incredibly complex matter in which something more than the mere motion of physical particles is involved. From the scientific point of view, there is simply no evidence that causation works in the implied, and evidence is at the root of this. For a scientist to say that the burden of proof is shifted from the responsibility to provide a falsifiable theory seems to go way beyond the remit of science. One might suppose that something in the nature of faith is being resorted to here, especially when the claim is made against the backdrop of scientific questions about the nature of consciousness — something which science has not yet come to grips with. However, if we are going to be on the same page here, we really are going to have to read some of the same stuff, and understand some of the concepts being employed at a greater depth.
The subject is, however, one of the most complex questions in philosophy, and has far more to do with the coherence of our thought about these matters than anyone seems prepared to admit. Is it just that we are not prepared to do the hard conceptual thinking that goes on in the area of free will and responsibility?
I feel the need to go deeper, so I shall attend to this question in posts to come.
“We can do A or B. ”
Really? I hope so, I act as if it were so but I find it difficult to think that it is so.
Eric:
You’re dodging the issue. You claimed that decisions we make might not be the outcome of the laws of physics. That was your claim. Your claim, therefore your responsibility to back it up. So I ask again: how could decisions we make not be the outcome of the laws of physics? How would this happen, and what is it that overrides the laws of physics.
You also stated that not everything that happens in consciousness is causally determined by the motion of particles in the brain. Again, your claim. Your responsibility to explain what causes consciousness, if not the particles in the brain.
Eric,
“I see no problem in the will being free and yet the world being deterministic.”
Here you implicitly grant “the will” an existence outside the world, as if it occupies another dimension. Materialistically, this is not the case. What we refer to as “the will” is not a thing. It is a process whereby the brain moves chemical and electrical signals transforming its state and triggering physical acts – like putting sugar in tea. This process is strictly part of the world and has nowhere else to be. The confusion, I think, comes from subjective experience which obscures the physics and biology.
“As Dennett says, we are great avoiders. So we can make a choice. But determinism doesn’t say that only one outcome is possible. It just says that there are causal relationships between events, which explain them.”
What Dennett is saying, I think, is that above the level of physics, the level of biology and evolution is where the interesting stuff occurs. Of course we know that chemistry and physics are the basis for biology. We avoid harm due to our genetic programming and learning. This means we are free in the sense we can avoid being eaten by a lion by taking care not to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Thus, we have evolved to live effectively in the world using our self-awareness and subjective sense of freedom. However, this level of freedom is based on the idea that the future is unknown. We have no real “choice” in our decisions, but we perceive freedom and enjoy the fruits of our evolved effectiveness at avoiding the bad and gaining the good. This is the level of freedom that Dennett says is worth having because no other conception of it is coherent or important. I may not have him exactly right, but I think this is basically it.
“When we see an animal hesitating over whether or not to enter into a fight with a rival, and then see him slink away, the situation seems to be that, given all the inputs, he might have done either, but thought living to fight again another day is preferable. Even that is choice.”
I would look at the situation differently. The animal is probably sizing up the rival and may notice that it is larger. This observation triggers patterns of hormones in the brain, which are genetically determined or are the residue of learning, which result in a state of nervous tension we might call apprehension. The neural processing reaches a threshold and triggers the urge to retreat. The urge to attack is present in the form of other hormones but these are overwhelmed and suppressed by the hormones associated with the apprehension. We may call this a “choice” if what we mean is that the outcome did not arise from some vaguely defined cloud of mystical thought, but from the abundance of certain chemicals. The change in brain states itself, which is in principle quantifiable and is often measurable, is what we mean when we say the animal made a “decision”.
“Where there are options, there cannot be strict predictability, but it doesn’t mean that we are any the less free, even if the choices we make are “unconscious,” that is, not put into explicit terms at the time.”
Recent experiments using FMRI suggest that decisions are made unconsciously in the few seconds before we are consciously aware that the decision has been made. A subject in the imager has his brain activity monitored while he goes through the process of making a decision to push a button. The pattern of brain activity indicates various state changes leading up to the actual button push. Observers later can look at the record of changes leading up to the button push and predict the outcome based on signals generated when the subject was not yet aware of the choice. Thus, the subject was “unaware” that the decision was made. The decision was made based on physical inputs and consciousness, where free will is supposed to reside, was not available to help make the determination. This contradicts the notion of free will that holds that we consciously make decisions after the waves of chemicals in the brain have had their chance.
“it attempts to reduce a complex social situation to physics. Not only does this not make sense, it is even incoherent.”
This is the argument that since the brain’s functioning is very complex then free will must be true. But, why would you accept that simple cases may be coherent but complex ones involving human social and psychological issues are somehow incoherent? I sense a strong emotional attachment to the idea of free will which subverts objectivity.
“I simply don’t see how we have come to the point where it seems adequate to say that particles move according to the laws of physics therefore we don’t choose,”
This is the argument from incredulity. If I don’t understand my experience unless I have contracausal free will, then free will must exist. I would only note that we all have a very insistent feeling of free will, but insistent feelings sometimes need to be held at bay while we seek objectivity. Isn’t science wonderful?
“It’s not that we jump out of causal series of events, but that we fit them in such a way as to provide a measure of discretion to the individual.”
But, under what force do we do the “fitting in”? Is “fitting” not just another causal series of events? You imply a “we” which exists apart from the causal events. The so called ghost in the machine, the Cartesian theater in which an homunculus views and then analyzes incoming signals. Read Steven Pinkers “The Blank Slate” and “How the Mind Works”.
“From the scientific point of view, there is simply no evidence that causation works in the implied [way], and evidence is at the root of this. For a scientist to say that the burden of proof is shifted from the responsibility to provide a falsifiable theory seems to go way beyond the remit of science.”
The evidence comes from the fact that material causation is seen everywhere else we look in the universe. During the gradual emergence of science as a process and a world view, progress has seen the discarding of one mysterious, non physical explanation after the other. If the universe is to be consistent with itself, this pattern should continue in every domain we explore. Discoveries are always open to disproof so we can never be absolutely certain, but evidence from neuroscience continues to confirm that conscious thought is synonymous with brain processing. Thoughts, ideas, concepts, feelings, all have there material correlates as physical states of the brain.
“One might suppose that something in the nature of faith is being resorted to here,”
Maybe so.
Skeptico:
I’m not dodging the issue at all. I said I do not know. It may be. But since there is no evidence either way, the answer “I don’t know” is appropriate. That’s all I said. The burden of proof, however, given our very lively sense that we do choose, lies with those who say that we don’t.
Rick:
Not so, I grant nothing of the sort. But I do think that the suggestion that there is a strict one-to-one physical correspondence with states of physical particles, and the outcome of decision making, has not been demonstrated, and may never be able to be demonstrated. The whole problem is the interposition of consciousness. No one has shown yet that this is a mere epiphenomenon, and until this has been shown, what the causal relationship is between physical causation and decision is not known. To suggest, as you do, that
is entirely unwarranted. fMRI does not show that it is measuring decisions at all. It measures bloodflow in the brain. There is no reason to think that this the detection of decisions that have been made. There is simply no warrant for this claim.
As to the argument from analogy:
This too is unwarranted. Causation must be demonstrated in each case. It cannot be simply assumed in this fashion. This is the whole point of Hume’s critique of the concept of cause, and why it is so very difficult to demonstrate causation in areas like evolutionary psychology and sociology. Besides, since we know that it follows form the laws of physics that the universe is even stranger than we can imagine, it simply does not seem that we can simply say that since fairly straightfoward causation works with respect to the movement of billiard balls or atoms or sub-atomic particles (though not when we get to the quantum level), therefore choice is caused in a similarly straightforward way. The problem here is that consciousness comes in between, consciousness, meaning, intention, purpose, action and agents and a whole lot of other things that cannot simply be ruled out by fiat — all parts of the natural world. Why can’t we just say, at this stage, “We don’t know”?
Besides, as I keep saying, even after all these arguments are played, and there seems to be some justification for extending ordinary causality to deal with decisions and choice, the fact that we use the language of decision and choice is not therefore the result of an illusion. For one of the things that Dennett points out is that we are really good avoiders, but not perfect ones. So our choices will not always be good ones. And if we can evaluate choices, and learn to do better, then we are exercising a sort of freedom that is important, even if we want to say also that the system as a whole is somehow deterministic. But not fatalistic, note, so there is room for choice which is mediated by brain and by mind. No one has demonstrated yet that mind or consciousness is a mere epiphenomenon. As soon as you have the evidence, let everyone know, because your book will sell like hotcakes! That assumes, of course, that you can make a judgement between reliable and unreliable evidence that the quesiton is closed! Please, please, pay attention to what Dennett is saying. It’s very important, and it cuts through a whole lot of this puzzlement, and the discussion which comes out of it. I hate to say this, but the scientistic answer that so many people are assuming here is simply a result of extending the canons of science into areas where they do not apply in a straightforward way.
Eric:
Now, I fully agree with your first statement: “…causation is involved at every point in some way”. But how do we get to a “measure of discretion”? I can only suppose that because the causation chains are so numerous, the mind only feels what the decision is to be. It’s as Antonio Damasio argues in “Descartes’ Error” that we not only think, but our body gives us the “feel” that our mind experiences. These are analog signals, not digital, and it means we are not computers in the digital sense. Along a surface of feeling, it may or may not be easy for one feeling to overwhelm another and precipitate a decision (rick @ 41). Chaotic behavior, however, has tipping points, and a minor change in position on a surface my lead to a sudden change in location on the surface (drops off a cliff), All this suggests that the decision making process can be extremely complicated and that our mind watches and weaves together a post hoc story as to how we arrived at the decision. Causation is involved at every point, and that is not free will.
Eric @ 42:
Even if we expand that to “… mediated by brain, body and by mind” are we not still left with additional new inputs that have been evaluated and learned, to be put to use influencing the next decision? Perhaps what was learned (imprinted on the neurons of the brain) will tip the balance on that next decision to be made.
Eric,
“is entirely unwarranted. fMRI does not show that it is measuring decisions at all. It measures bloodflow in the brain. There is no reason to think that this the detection of decisions that have been made.”
In fact I don’t think there is much doubt that this is sound research. Look it up.
Regardless if the measurement is blood flow or electrical signals, if in fact a double blind test allows predicting the ultimate button press it means there is a definite correlation between the activity of the brain prior to conscious awareness and the final “choice”. The interpretation I described is hard to ignore.
Rick. You did not pay attention to the tense of what I said. I said that it is unwarranted to suppose that detecting blood flow is equivalent to detecting decisions that have been made. If you sit someone in a chair with a button, and then ask them to do the simple task of pressing a button, and then tell them to indicate when they first became conscious of the decision to press the button, there are simply too many variables involved. There is, first of all, a latency involved in the very task. So, as a person comes to the point of deciding, there is of course brain activity which accompanies this. In what way is this latency the decision itself? Especially when you consider that the subject is being asked to do two tasks: (i) the pressing of the button, and (ii) telling the researcher when the conscious act is felt. As Dennett has pointed out, watching the clock may cause a temporal mismatch between one and the other. We’re talking 50 milliseconds here, which is perhaps about the time that it would take to focus on the two task sequentially. But in more complex tasks, the problem of interpretation becomes much more difficult. Ask someone to choose items on a menu, for example, and there will no doubt be blood flow, but which blood flow is to be identified with the making of the decision, and when did it occur? The supposition that the correlation is unproblematic is intuitively (it seems to me) is a bit hazardous. And this, while more complex, is a fairly simply act of choice. Other choices and correlated brain activity would make the interpretation that much more difficult. (By the way, Jerry uses the figure of 7 seconds. Where did that come from? Do you know?)
Dave. You say:
In what way is this a problem? Of course, learning must change the structure of the brain, and it alters the structure of the personality too. That’s fine. But still, we’re not talking about every decision being originative in some metaphysical sense. That would make a nonsense out of human action altogether. We are the people we are and have become in the world that we inhabit, where all sorts of causal influences come to bear. This still doesn’t diminish one whit the ability to make decisions, or alter the fact that how we make decisions will make a big difference to ourselves and others.
The very ability to assess the value or disvalue of choices is a part of what is meant by being able to choose. Being completely unaffected by causal influences is not a condition of the genuineness of choice. Some people make good choices, and some make very poor ones, and we can actually learn to make better ones, and be held responsible for our bad decisions. If we do not choose what we choose in any sense of those words, that A Clockwork Orange is only the beginning of the horror that we may engineer for ourselves — justified, no doubt, ex post facto. BF Skinner thought we were simply stimulus response organisms too, and his idea of education was simply bizarre. Why should we take this sort of thing seriously, or want to?
Eric,
As reported in Wired, on 4/13/2008:
Rick is correct. The subconscious makes decisions long before we are conscious of them. That’s 7,000 milliseconds. Your comment about a 50 millisecond delay due to monitoring two tasks is simply swamped by the processes prior to pushing the button or becoming aware of making a decision.
Eric, the first time I read this article I decided not to make a comment but then I re-ran the tape and here it is.
Does this help ?
(this post in no way endorses contra-causal free will)
Here is the crux of the issue:
…at this ‘point of deciding’ is there anything other than brain activity? If not, is brain activity non-deterministic?
Science is satisfied that there is almost certainly only deterministic brain activity, although the full unravelling of all that is involved is not anywhere near complete. Free will and consciousness certainly feel real – as if some ‘inner man’ was driving our body – but this is an illusion. However just because the feelings are illusions doesn’t mean that something else isn’t going on.
For evolutionary and social purposes free will and consciousness exist as useful fictions. But then people believe in all sorts of things.
I can see that I am going to have to do more on this. First off, Steve — no, nothing I have said speaks about contracausal free will, though it is still an unproved assumption that there cannot be. As to the rest. I think there is a failure of communication here. It is not the case that “free will” is a fiction. Free will, whatever it is, is not what is really at issue, for free will is defined in different ways, and I am not altogether sure that there is any definition that would be accepted by everyone, so we are probably discussing different things. However, the matter of choice has been mentioned, and I think it makes a nonsense to say, as some people want to say, that we do not choose what we choose. That seems to me to be a category mistake, but in order to show this, I need to think more about the matter, since obviously I haven’t even managed to get across what I thought I was trying to say. However, this really must wait for another time, because it does demand some serious work.
Again, science does not explain consciousness, no matter how many times people try and explain it in terms of physics, physics has nothing to do with consciousness.
Of course there is interaction between the material world and the mental world, but extending beyond the material into the mental is speculation.
It’s rather like trying to predict the results of a computer program by using Newton’s laws of motion.
Actually you did not say you didn’t know. You asked, rhetorically, “Why cannot … decisions not be the outcome of those laws?” Most people would understand you to be suggesting decisions were not the outcome of those laws. Still, I’m glad you now agree we can’t know.
But you are wrong about the burden of proof. You are suggesting that there might be something other than the laws of physics that are acting on consciousness / decision making. That is a positive claim, and the burden of proof is always with the one making the positive claim. By reversing this, you are saying there might be something other than the laws of physics, and unless Coyne can prove there isn’t, then we should assume there is. You must know that is fallacious and absurd.
And you must also know that you can’t use “our very lively sense” as a basis for determining what is likely. You know that we can’t trust our senses – do I really need to spell out why? I think not.
And even by suggesting that there might be something other than the laws of physics (even if you say it just “may” exist), then you really do need to describe what you think it is and give us some reason to suppose it exists (beyond what your lively sense tells you). If not, you’re just making stuff up. And dodging the question.
Egbert:
And you know this, how?
What makes you say the mental world is not part of the physical world.
Actually it’s nothing at all like that.
Eric @ 50:
I quite agree with you that we are discussing different things. Perhaps your statement that it is nonsense to say we do not choose what we choose helps unravel this. First, let us say we do choose what we choose. I am not sure we really can say otherwise. Now it seems to be the case, based on the neurological evidence, that the subconscious makes the decision before we become consciously aware of the decision. But it certainly seems to each of us that we “make” a conscious decision. So where does the discussion of free will go off the rails?
I am sitting here at almost midnight, thinking that I really should go to sleep so I can play a decent game of tennis tomorrow morning, yet fascinated about the problem set forth in this exchange. And now my wife mumbles something about coming to bed, and to me, tennis overrules pursuing this. Like Eric, I need to think a bit more, and that will wait until tomorrow. There are too many inputs to untangle.
Skeptico,
I know this because there is nothing in physics that deals with consciousness. Again, it’s a categorical error that materialists and naturalists assume that it does.
Now, this is my positively last comment on this thread, since I want to get back to Hitchens and other things for a bit.
Skeptico, you say that I didn’t say that we don’t know. But I had said, much earlier, that
Which is what I was referring to when I said that I had said that we do not know.
Dr. Dave (Dave Fischer). The 2008 article you point to is interesting, and I missed it last night. I’m not sure what it says — nor am I sure what any brain scanning experiments say — about the issue we are discussing. Though 7 seconds seems like a significant time lapse that cannot be explained by Dennett’s mismatching, it is still not entirely clear to me that this deals with the question of whether we actually do choose. As Haynes himself was aware, his experimental findings may not be about actual real life decision making:
And, besides, I have said, and so have a number of philosophers like Dennett and Flanagan and Dworkin, that this is not an issue of contra-causation. I need to revisit some of this before I enlarge on that. As I said, I’m not an expert in this, but it does seem to me to be simply unhelpful to use brain scan experiments of simple contexts of choice to interpret other, much more complex processes. I assume that, whatever turns out to be the case, before a decision is made there will always be brain activity related to the occasion of decision, and that some of it will precede the decision. It does not seem to me that this means that the brain activity that precedes the decision is simply identifiable with the decision itself. However, the whole issue is deeply complex and almost mesmerising, but I need to do some more research before jumping into the fray again. Trust me, though, I will come back to it.
Eric, I think you would find Raymond Tallis’s ‘Aping Mankind’ pertinent to what you are getting at. He was a professor of gerontology at the University of Manchester, and has published papers on experiments in neuro-science that he himself has conducted.
Egbert:
Yet.
No, the error is yours, in assuming it doesn’t. We just see no need to invent stuff to explain things that just aren’t fully understood yet. We know the material world exists; we do not know of any non-material world.
Eric:
OK, I accept you are saying we don’t know and I apologize for earlier misconstruing what you were saying.
However, you are suggesting that there might be something at work other than the laws of physics. If you are suggesting this then you need to describe what you think it is and give us some reason to suppose it exists (beyond what your unreliable senses tell you). If you can’t give us some reason to think this additional “thing” exists, then you should accept that you are just grasping at straws to preserve what you have admitted you just feel is true or want to be true. I think it’s quite OK to say that we need experimental data before we can form a conclusion. You can’t form a solid conclusion with reason and logic alone, you need data, and the data so far is interesting (I think you write it off too quickly, actually) but inconclusive. More experiments need to be done, replicated etc. But you can’t refute it either by using the flawed logic of the ‘there might be something in addition to the laws of physics’ kind. Not without giving us a an idea of what it is and reason to suppose it exists.
Not to kick a dead horse, but, I’ve just watched 2 more youtube videos of Dan Dennett lectures. In these he outlines “Freedom Evolves” in quite a bit of detail. Each is over an hour. The question period at the end of each bring out some significant clarifications.
Daniel Dennett – Free Will Determinism and Evolution
Daniel Dennett lecture on “Free Will” (Edinburgh University)
Dan gives wonderful examples that are fascinating to listen to. What an erudite character he is. The two films have some overlap but also enough unique perspectives so that both are worth while watching – if you have the luxury of time.
From this I have gotten a better idea of what Eric may be trying to say. Dan is a compatablist which means he finds it possible to reconcile the seeming incompatibility of determinism and free will. Basically, he says, yes the word is deterministic, but, still we have (a form of) free will. The trick is to see that through the evolved complexity of agents – living things – a true kind of free will has come into existence which is not a magical new force from outside the universe. An Italian newpaper interviewed Dan and published the headline, “Yes we have souls, but they are made of tiny robots!”
I think what I and some others have been arguing is that advocates of free will seem to be denying determinism. As we see, this is not necessarily the case. Some of this debate amounts to talking past one another. Coyne puts emphasis on determinism and denys a kind of magical or dualistic free will (if I remember well). Dan would certainly agree with that but points out that this does not obviate an important kind of free will. Dan also touches on the significance of freedom for law and politics.
Eric may want to be a Dennett compatablist, or maybe not.
Skeptico and Rick. Thanks for the discussion. As I said, I really do need to look at this in more depth. I do not think, as Rick has already divined, that there need be anything more going on than can be accounted for by the laws of physics, but, as Dennett points out, this is not necessarily entirely predictable, given those laws. Again, though, I hope you will grant me the time to read and study at more depth the issues at play here. I do think we are probably all coming at this from points of view that are not sufficiently informed by the contemporary discussion of this in both neuroscience and philosophy. Tim, thanks for the reference to Raymond Tallis.
I found another interesting Dennett video which is short and a pretty good summary of some of these issues. He starts with the question of why people have a problem understanding consciousness and follows with the connection of attitudes toward free will.
http:// bigthink dot com/ideas/13466
Alas, after all the arguments, my predictions come true. No working definitions for determinism or free will, a lot of confusion and talking past each other, and no resolution.
Here are the main distinctions I have been able to identify:
1) Determinism (no free will) means that choice is impossible.
2) Free will (no determinism) is the expression of an agency outside and not beholden to the laws of physics.
The opponents of determinism tend to stick to definition 1, since it is easy to defeat, and opponents of free will stick to definition 2 because it requires things that have no evidence for their existence. Notice that these 2 definitions are not equivalent.
I hate to be so elementary, but a coherent definition must be stated at the outset to avoid all this. If we are going to go on about this anymore, a working definition has to be established. I personally must keep both concepts in the trash bin until I know what the heck these terms are supposed to mean, because as it stands they mean nothing.
John K, while I agree that part of the problem of “free will” is a problem of definition, there is an important part of it that isn’t.
Take your two distinctions:
First, determinism does mean that choice is impossible. This is Jerry’s and Sam Harris’s position. There is simply no indeterminacy. But there is no evidence for this. Indeed, it is difficult to see what would constitute such evidence. So this is not a scientific position, but a matter of faith.
Second, free will does indeed mean that there is causal indeterminacy, but it does not imply that there is necessarily what philosophers call “agent causation,” as though agency stands outside the causal network altogether — which indeed would make no or little sense. This simply does not follow, and this is the response that people like Frankfurt, Dennett, Flanagan and others propose. However, for Jerry and Sam, this is ruled out by their undefended contention that the universe is through and through deterministic, when there is no reason why scientists need to hold that the universe is deterministic. Indeed, it seems that there is a certain amount of indeterminacy even at the level of fruit flies. See:
http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/early/2010/12/14/rspb.2010.2325.full
I don’t see why this is so hard to understand.
I took the statement “we do not choose what we choose” to imply that choice was impossible. I apologize if that is not what you meant, but it does seem to follow.
As for the second statement, I don’t think you were ever operating under that definition, but at least one commenter asserted that you were, hence the miscommunication. There seem to be many concepts of free will, the two I listed were ones I identified in this thread, but rarely does anyone ever actually specify which one they are actually using.
As much as people are able to say what free will is not, there are few who will put forward what it actually is. I will read your link as time permits and naturally take back my criticism if it provides the definitions I am looking for.
I am grateful you took the time to address me on a thread you twice vowed not to post in anymore. Again, only engage while you find it useful.
Although this is an “old” thread, I feel compelled, due to my software, fleshy automaton that I apparently am, to mention a couple points . To me at least, given my (possibly) sub-standard programming, this issue is very difficult to discuss clearly. Presumptions and superficially nasty inferences about intentions (now there’s irony) seem inappropriate given the difficulty of the topic. I agree with you, in that I am puzzled by Prof. Coyne’s apparent belief that being told you are a meat robot will make you a kindler gentler meat robot. It seems to me that it may just as easily lead to the reasonable conclusion that meat robots with defective programming are best disassembled for scrap, and sooner rather than later. And the software enjoyed by some robots will, I suspect, convince them that they are best able to choose. Perhaps I am missing an obvious, or even subtle, point, but it appears to me that the belief in a kindler and gentler future requires a certain level of presumption regarding the nature and content of the software, as well as the outward circumstances it msut confront. If we are going with the idea that the software “evolves” then, as best I recall, it should evolve to fit the circumstances. Depending on the circumstances, that evolution need not result in what we today would call progress. Finally, a belief in meat robots is not – as best I can tell – inherently atheistic. Certainly, an all-powerful god can create a race of meat robots. Show of hands for a variation on predestination? Any errors in the above thoughts are the fault of programming and causal impacts over which I had no control, so don’t blame me (although you may nevetheless choose to take me out of service indefinitely before I impact someone else).